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Abstract
In default theories, outliers denote sets of literals featuring unexpected prop-
erties. In previous papers, we have defined outliers in default logics and in-
vestigated their formal properties. Specifically, we have looked into the com-
putational complexity of outlier detection problems and proved that while
they are generally intractable, interesting tractable cases can be singled out.
Following those results, we study here the tractability frontier in outlier de-
tection problems, by analyzing it with respect to (i) the considered outlier
detection problem, (ii) the reference default logic fragment, and (iii) the
adopted notion of outlier. As for point (i), we shall consider three problems
of increasing complexity, called Outlier-Witness Recognition, Outlier Recog-
nition and Outlier Existence, respectively. As for point (ii), as we look for
conditions under which outlier detection can be done efficiently, attention
will be limited to subsets of Disjunction-free propositional default theories.
As for point (iii), we shall refer to both the notion of outlier of (Angiulli
et al., 2008) and a new and more restrictive one, called strong outlier. After
complexity results, we present a polynomial time algorithm for enumerating
all strong outliers of bounded size in an quasi-acyclic normal unary default
theory. Some of our tractability results rely on the Incremental Lemma that
provides conditions for a deafult logic fragment to have a monotonic behavior.
Finally, in order to show that the simple fragments of DL we deal with are
still rich enough to solve interesting problems and, therefore, the tractability
results that we prove are interesting not only on the mere theoretical side,
insights into the expressive capabilities of these fragments are provided, by
showing that normal unary theories express all NL queries, hereby indirectly
answering a question raised by Kautz and Selman.
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1. Introduction
Consider a rational agent acquiring information about the world, where
such information is stated in the form of a sets of facts. In this setting, it
is certainly relevant to recognize if some of these facts are outliers, that is,
facts that disagree with her own expectations of the behavior of the world.
The normal behavior of the world could be encoded somehow using one of
the several non-monotonic languages defined and studied in the Artificial
Intelligence literature (Winston, 1998; Russell and Norvig, 2003; Neapoli-
tan and Xia, 2012). Among those, Reiter’s default logic (Reiter, 1980), has
unquestionably gained a much prominent role (Poole et al., 1998; Minker,
2000).
In the paper (Angiulli et al., 2008), we have formally defined the notion
of outlier in the context of knowledge bases expressed in Reiter’s default logic
and studied some of the associated computational problems. Outliers can be
intuitively described as sets of anomalous observations in that they feature
some properties contrasting with those that can be logically “justified” ac-
cording to the given knowledge base. Along with outliers, their witnesses are
to be singled out. Witnesses are sets of observations that encode the reason
why the observations marked as outliers are identified as such.
To illustrate, consider a scenario where a credit card number is used sev-
eral times during a specific day to pay for services provided through the
Internet. This sounds normal so far, but add to that the fact that the pay-
ment is done through different IPs, each of which is located in a different
country. It might be the case that the credit card owner is traveling on this
particular day, but if the different countries from which the credit card is
used are located in different continents, we might get really suspicious about
who has put his hands on these credit card numbers. In our terminology, we
say that the fact that the credit card number is used in different continents
during the same day makes this credit card an outlier.
As shown in (Angiulli et al., 2008), outlier detection problems are gener-
ally computationally quite hard, their associated complexities ranging from
DP-complete to DP3 -complete, depending on the specific form of problem one
deals with. For this reason, in (Angiulli et al., 2010) we have looked into
significant fragments of general Reiter’s default logics where lower complexi-
ties are involved. In particular, while the outlier detection problems remains
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NP-hard several language fragments, a tractable case was actually singled
out. The case is the Outlier-Witness recognition problem (the problem of
telling if, for the theory at hand, a given pair of sets of literals indeed forms
an outlier-witness pair), that was proved to be solvable in polynomial time
over normal unary default theories.
This initial tractability result prompted us to embark on a more sys-
tematic study of the tractability frontier associated with outlier detection
problems. To illustrate, in the papers (Angiulli et al., 2008, 2010) three ba-
sic outlier detection problems of increasing complexity have been defined,
that are:
• Outlier-Witness Recognition,
• Outlier Recognition, and
• Outlier Existence.
Clear enough, for any of the above problems, the computational complexity
underlying outlier detection depends on the exact default language used to
encode the background knowledge base ∆ and on the specific notion of outlier
one intends to deal with. In particular, we know from previous results )
that the most general of the problems above, namely, Outlier Existence,
and the simpler Outlier recognition problem, are NP-hard even on normal
unary theories. On the other hand, on such form of theories, the problem
Outlier-Witness Recognition is solvable in polynomial time(Angiulli et al.,
2008, 2010).
In this paper, we continue along this line of research and try to depict
the contour of the tractability region for outlier detection problems. To this
end, we shall again consider well-known simple fragments of default logic,
such as normal unary theories, and the more general mixed normal unary
theories, and we shall introduce a new natural notion of outlier, which we
call strong outlier. This notion restricts outliers to be only those featuring a
tight relationship of the outlier set with its witness. Along the way, we shall
also prove some side-, yet interesting, results regarding the expressiveness of
the language fragments mentioned above, and regarding some monotonicity
property featured by mixed normal unary theories.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section recalls preliminary
notions about computational complexity, Reiter’s propositional default logic
and its language fragments that we will be deal with, the notion of outliers as
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defined in (Angiulli et al., 2008) and, finally, the outlier detection problems
we will focus on. Section 3 provides some results about the default logic
fragments referred to above. We will first discuss the expressive capabilities
featured (via entailment) by the simple fragments of default logic to which
we have to resort in order to chart the tractability frontier of outlier detection
problems. These results show that, although very simple, these fragments
are indeed rich enough to solve interesting problems. Second, we will present
the Incremental Lemma, which provides an interesting and useful monotonic-
ity characterization of mixed normal unary theories theories. Third, we will
prove a technical lemma (Lemma 3.11) which shows how the evaluation of
the truth value of a CNF formula under a specific assignment can be accom-
plished in a way that relates it to the definition of outliers. The next four
sections are devoted to drawing the tractability frontier associated with the
outlier detection problems Outlier-Witness Recognition, Outlier Recognition
and Outlier Existence, and to presenting the tractable Outlier Enumeration
algorithm. We conclude with a detailed discussion on the transition between
tractability and intractability in outlier detection using default logic in Sec-
tion 8 and, in Section 9, we draw some final remarks.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Complexity theory
In this section we recall some basic definitions and results of complexity
theory. The reader is referred to (Johnson, 1990) for additional information.
Decision problems are maps from strings (encoding the input instance
over a fixed alphabet, e.g., the binary alphabet {0, 1}) to the set {“yes”, “no”}.
For a given input x, its size is denoted by ||x||. The class P is the set of deci-
sion problems that can be solved by a deterministic Turing machine in time
polynomial in the input size. machines using a work-space of logarithmic size
is denoted by L. Throughout the paper, we shall often refer to computations
carried out by non-deterministic Turing machines. We recall that these are
Turing machines that, at some points of the computation, may not have one
single next action to perform, but a choice between several possible next
actions. A non-deterministic Turing machine answers a decision problem if,
on any input x, there is at least one sequence of choices leading to halt in an
accepting state if x is a “yes” instance (such a sequence is called accepting
computation path); and, if x is a “no” instance, all possible sequences of
choices lead to a rejecting state. The class of decision problems that can be
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solved by non-deterministic Turing machines using a work-space of logarith-
mic size is denoted by NL. The class of decision problems that can be solved
by non-deterministic Turing machines in polynomial time is denoted by NP.
Problems in NP enjoy the property that any “yes” instance x has a certificate
for it being a “yes” instance, which has polynomial length and which can be
checked in polynomial time (in the size ||x||). The class of problems whose
complementary problems are in NP is denoted by co-NP.
Recall that an oracle is a subroutine which is supposed to require constant
computational resources to terminate. The classes ΣPk , Π
P
k , and ∆
P
k , forming
the polynomial hierarchy, are defined as follows: ΣP0 = Π
P
0 = P and for all
k ≥ 1, ΣPk = NPΣ
P
k−1 , ∆Pk = P
ΣPk−1 , and ΠPk = co-Σ
P
k where co-Σ
P
k denotes
the class of problems whose complementary problem is solvable in ΣPk . Here,
ΣPk (resp., ∆
P
k ) models computability by a non-deterministic (resp., deter-
ministic) polynomial-time Turing machine that may use an oracle in ΣPk−1.
Note that ΣP1 coincides with NP, and that Π
P
1 coincides with co-NP.
Next, the class DP
k
is the class of problems that can be defined as a
conjunction of two problems, one from ΣPk and one from Π
P
k . Thus, D
Pk is a
superset of both ΣPk and one from Π
P
k (and, in particular, D
P is a superset
of both NP and co-NP).
We conclude by recalling the notion of reducibility among decision prob-
lems. A decision problem A1 is polynomially reducible to a decision problem
A2, denoted by A1 ≤p A2, if there is a polynomial-time computable function
h (called reduction) such that, for every x, h(x) is defined and x is a “yes” in-
stance of A1 if and only if h(x) is a “yes” instance of A2. A decision problem
A is hard for a class C of the polynomial hierarchy (at any level k ≥ 1, i.e.,
beyond P) if every problem in C is polynomially reducible to A; if A is hard
for C and belongs to C, then A is said to be complete for C. Thus, problems
that are complete for C are the most difficult problems in C. In particular,
they cannot belong to some lower class in the hierarchy unless some collapse
occurs.
2.2. Reiter’s Default Logic
Default logic was introduced by Reiter (Reiter, 1980) and we next recall
basic facts about its propositional fragment. For T , a propositional theory,
and S, a set of propositional formulae, T ∗ denotes the logical closure of T ,
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and ¬S the set {¬s|s ∈ S}1. A set of literals L is inconsistent if ¬` ∈ L
for some literal ` ∈ L. Given a literal `, letter(`) denotes the letter in
the literal `. Given a set of literals L, letter(L) denotes the set {A | A =
letter(`) for some ` ∈ L}.
2.2.1. Syntax
A propositional default theory ∆ is a pair (D,W ) where W is a set of
propositional formulae and D is a set of default rules. We assume that both
sets D and W are finite. A default rule δ is
α : β1, . . . , βm
γ
(1)
where α (called prerequisite), βi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (called justifications) and γ
(called consequent) are propositional formulae. For δ a default rule, pre(δ),
just(δ), and concl(δ) denote the prerequisite, justification, and consequent
of δ, respectively. Analogously, given a set of default rules, D = {δ1, . . . , δn},
pre(D), just(D), and concl(D) denote, respectively, the sets {pre(δ1), . . .,
pre(δn)}, (just(δ1)∪ . . .∪ just(δn)), and {concl(δ1), . . . , concl(δn)}. The pre-
requisite may be missing, whereas the justification and the consequent are
required (an empty justification denotes the presence of the identically true
literal true specified therein). The informal meaning of a default rule δ is as
follows: If pre(δ) is known to hold and if it is consistent to assume just(δ),
then infer concl(δ).
Next, we introduce some well-known subsets of propositional default the-
ories relevant to our purposes (see (Reiter, 1980; Kautz and Selman, 1991)).
Normal theories. If the conclusion of a default rule is identical to
the justification the rule is called normal. A default theory containing only
normal default rules is called normal.
Disjunction-free theories. A default theory ∆ = (D,W ) is disjunction
free (DF for short) (Kautz and Selman, 1991), if W is a set of literals, and,
for each δ in D, pre(δ), just(δ), and concl(δ) are conjunctions of literals.
Normal mixed unary theories. A DF default theory is normal mixed
unary (NMU for short) if its set of defaults contains only rules of the form
α:β
β
, where α is either empty or a single literal and β is a single literal.
Normal and dual normal unary theories. An NMU default theory
is normal unary (NU for short) if the prerequisite of each default is either
1As usual, for any letter a, we assume ¬¬a = a.
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empty or positive. An NMU default theory is dual normal (DNU for short)
unary if the prerequisite of each default is either empty or negative.
Next, the concept of quasi-acyclic theory is introduced. We begin by
introducing the notions of atomic dependency graph and that of tightness of
a NMU default theory.
Definition 2.1 (Atomic Dependency Graph). Let ∆ = (D,W ) be a
NMU default theory. The atomic dependency graph (V,E) of ∆ is a directed
graph such that
– V = {l | l is a letter occurring in ∆}, and
– E = {(x, y) | letters x and y occur respectively in the prerequisite and
the consequent of a default in D}.
Definition 2.2 (A set influences a literal). Let ∆ = (D,W ) be an NMU
default theory. We say that a set of literals S influences a literal l in ∆ if for
some t ∈ S there is a path from letter(t) to letter(l) in the atomic dependency
graph of ∆.
Definition 2.3 (Tightness of an NMU theory). The tightness c of an
NMU default theory is the size c (in terms of number of atoms) of the largest
strongly connected component (SCC) of its atomic dependency graph.
Intuitively, a quasi-acyclic NMU default theory is a theory whose tightness
is upper-bouded by a fixed constant.
Definition 2.4 (quasi-acyclic NMU theory). Given a fixed positive in-
teger c, a NMU default theory is said to be (c-)quasi-acyclic, if its tightness
is not greater than c.
Figure 1 highlights the set-subset relationships holding between the above
defined fragments of default logic.
2.2.2. Semantics
The formal semantics of a default theory ∆ is defined in terms of exten-
sions. A set E is an extension for a theory ∆ = (D,W ) if it satisfies the
following set of equations:
• E0 = W ,
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Figure 1: A map of the investigated default theory fragments
• for i ≥ 0, Ei+1 = E∗i ∪
{
γ | α:β1,...,βm
γ
∈ D,α ∈ Ei,¬β1 6∈ E , . . . ,¬βm 6∈ E
}
,
• E =
∞⋃
i=0
Ei.
Given a default δ and an extension E , we say that δ is applicable in E if
pre(δ) ∈ E and ( 6 ∃c ∈ just(δ))(¬c ∈ E).
It is well known that an extension E of a finite propositional default
theory ∆ = (D,W ) can be finitely characterized through the set DE of the
generating defaults for E w.r.t. ∆ (the reader is referred to (Reiter, 1980;
Zhang and Marek, 1990) for definitions).
A finite propositional default theory ∆ = (D,W ) has an extension E iff
there exists a set DE ⊆ D, the generating defaults of E w.r.t. ∆, that can be
partitioned into a finite number of strata D
(0)
E , D
(1)
E , . . . , D
(n)
E , such that:
• D(0)E = {δ | δ ∈ DE , pre(δ) ∈ W ∗},
• for each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, D(i)E = {δ | δ ∈ DE −
⋃i−1
j=0D
(j)
E , pre(δ) ∈
(W ∪ concl(⋃i−1j=0D(j)E ))∗},
and, moreover:
• (∀δ ∈ DE)(∀β ∈ just(δ))(¬β 6∈ (W ∪ concl(DE))∗), and
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• (∀δ ∈ D)(pre(δ) ∈ (W ∪ concl(DE))∗ ∧ (∀β ∈ just(δ))(¬β 6∈ (W ∪
concl(DE))∗ ⇒ δ ∈ DE).
If such a set DE exists, then E = (W ∪concl(DE))∗ is an extension of ∆. Next
we introduce a characterization of an extension of a finite DF propositional
theory which is based on a lemma from (Kautz and Selman, 1991).
Lemma 2.5. Let ∆ = (D,W ) be a DF default theory; then E is an extension
of ∆ if and only if there exists a sequence of defaults δ1, ..., δn from D and a
sequence of sets E0, E1, ..., En, such that for all i > 0:
• E0 = W ,
• Ei = Ei−1 ∪ concl(δi),
• pre(δi) ∈ Ei−1,
• ( 6 ∃c ∈ just(δi))(¬c ∈ En),
• ( 6 ∃δ ∈ D)(pre(δ) ∈ En ∧ concl(δ) 6⊆ En ∧ ( 6 ∃c ∈ just(δ))(¬c ∈ En)),
• E is the logical closure of En,
where En is called the signature set of E and is denoted liter(E) and the
sequence of rules δ1, ..., δn is the set DE of generating defaults of E.
Although default theories are non-monotonic, normal default theories
satisfy the property of semi-monotonicity (see Theorem 3.2 of (Reiter, 1980)).
Semi-monotonicity in default logic means the following: Let ∆ = (D,W )
and ∆′ = (D′,W ) be two default theories such that D ⊆ D′; then for every
extension E of ∆ there is an extension E ′ of ∆′ such that E ⊆ E ′.
A default theory may not have any extensions (an example is the theory
({ :β¬β}, ∅). A default theory is called coherent if it has at least one extension,
and incoherent otherwise. Normal default theories are always coherent. A
coherent default theory ∆ = (D,W ) is called inconsistent if it has just one
extension which is inconsistent. By Theorem 2.2 of (Reiter, 1980), the theory
∆ is inconsistent iff W is inconsistent.
The theories examined in this paper are always coherent and consistent,
since only normal default theories (D,W ) with W a consistent set of literals
are taken into account.
The entailment problem for default theories is as follows: Given a default
theory ∆ and a propositional formula φ, does every extension of ∆ contain φ?
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In the affirmative case, we write ∆ |= φ. For a set of propositional formulas
S, we analogously write ∆ |= S to denote (∀φ ∈ S)(∆ |= φ).
2.3. Outliers in Default Logic
The issue of outlier detection in default theories has been extensively
discussed in (Angiulli et al., 2008). The formal definition of outlier introduced
in that paper is as explained next. For a given set W and a collection of sets
S1, . . . , Sn, WS1,...,Sn denotes the set W \ (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn).
Definition 2.6 (Outlier and Outlier Witness Set). (Angiulli et al., 2008)
Let ∆ = (D,W ) be a propositional default theory and let L ⊆ W be a set
of literals. If there exists a non-empty subset S of WL such that:
1. (D,WS) |= ¬S, and
2. (D,WS,L) 6|= ¬S
then L is an outlier set in ∆ and S is an outlier witness set for L in ∆.
The intuitive explanation of the different roles played by an outlier and its
witness is as follows. Condition (i) of Definition 2.6 states that the outlier
witness set S denotes something that does not agree with the knowledge
encoded in the defaults. Indeed, by removing S from the theory at hand,
we obtain ¬S. In other words, if S had not been explicitly observed, then,
according to the given defaults, we would have concluded the exact opposite.
Moreover, condition (ii) of Definition 2.6 states that the outlier L is a set
of literals that, when removed from the theory, makes such a disagreement
disappear. Indeed, by removing both S and L from the theory, ¬S is no
longer obtained. In other words, disagreement for S is a consequence of the
presence of L in the theory. To summarize, the set S witnesses that the piece
of knowledge denoted by L behaves, in a sense, exceptionally, thus telling us
that L is an outlier set and S is its associated outlier witness set.
The above intuition is illustrated by referring to the example on stolen
credit card numbers given in the introduction. A default theory ∆ = (D,W )
that encodes that episode might be as follows:
– D =
{
CreditNumber:¬MultipleIPs
¬MultipleIPs
}
,
– W = {CreditNumber,MultipleIPs}.
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where, intuitively: (a) CreditNumber is true if a given credit card number
has been used for purchasing something today; (b) MultipleIPs is true if
that credit card number has been used from (computers located in) differ-
ent continents today. Here, the credit card number might be stolen, for
otherwise it would not have been used over different continents during the
same day. Accordingly, L = {CreditNumber} is an outlier set here, and
S = {MultipleIPs} is the associated witness set. This agrees with our intu-
ition that an outlier is, in some sense, abnormal and that the corresponding
witness testifies to it. Note that sets of outliers and their corresponding wit-
ness sets are selected among those explicitly embodied in the given knowledge
base. Hence, we look at outlier detection using default reasoning essentially
as a knowledge discovery technique, whereby abnormalities and their presum-
able associated explanations can be automatically singled out in the knowl-
edge base at hand. Several application examples showing the usefulness of
the notion of outlier in default logics are given in (Angiulli et al., 2008).
2.4. Outlier detection problems
The intrinsic complexity of reasoning in default logics has been studied
in some classical papers (Kautz and Selman, 1991; Stillman, 1992; Gottlob,
1992). The notion of outlier is based on entailment, but its structure makes
the associated computational problems usually harder than basic entailment
ones, as demonstrated in (Angiulli et al., 2008, 2010), where the complexity of
discovering outliers in default theories under various classes of default logics
has been investigated. The main recognition tasks in outlier detection are the
Outlier Existence, Outlier Recognition and the Outlier-Witness Recognition
problems (also called Outlier, Outlier(L) and Outlier(S)(L), respectively,
in (Angiulli et al., 2008)), and are defined as follows:
- Outlier-Witness Recognition Problem (Outlier(L)(S)): Given a
default theory ∆ = (D,W ) and two sets of literals L ⊂ W and S ⊆ WL,
is L an outlier set with witness set S in ∆?
- Outlier Recognition Problem (Outlier(L)): Given a default theory
∆ = (D,W ) and a set of literals L ⊆ W , is L an outlier set in ∆ (for
some witness set S)?
- Outlier Existence Problem (Outlier): Given a default theory ∆ =
(D,W ) and a positive integer k, is there any outlier set L in ∆ such
that |L| ≤ k (for some witness set S)?
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Table 1: Complexity results for outlier detection (∗=reported in (Angiulli et al., 2008),
∗∗=reported in (Angiulli et al., 2010))
Problem
Outlier
Type
General
Default
DF
Default
(D)NU
Default
quasi-acyclic
(D)NU
Default
Outlier Existence
General
ΣP3 -c Σ
P
2 -c NP-c NP-c
Th. 4.1∗ Th. 4.1∗ Th. 3.5∗∗ Th. 6.2
Strong
NP-hard NP-c NP-c
Th. 6.1 Th. 6.1 Th. 6.2
Outlier Recognition
General
ΣP3 -c Σ
P
2 -c NP-c NP-c
Th. 4.3∗ Th. 4.3∗ Th. 3.6∗∗ Th. 5.2
Strong
NP-hard NP-c P
Th. 5.9 Th. 5.9 Th. 5.8
General
DP2 -c D
P-c P P
Outlier-Witness Th. 4.6∗ Th. 4.6∗ Th. 3.1∗∗ Th. 3.1∗∗
Recognition
Strong
NP-hard P P
Lemma 5.6 Lemma 5.5 Lemma 5.5
Table 1 summarizes previous complexity results, together with the results
that constitute the contributions of the present work that will be detailed
later in this section.
In particular, the complexity of outlier detection tasks has been studied in
(Angiulli et al., 2008) for general and disjunction-free (DF) default theories
and in (Angiulli et al., 2010) for (dual) normal unary default theories. The
results reported in the cited papers pointed out that the general problem
of recognizing an outlier set is always intractable (Theorem 4.3 in (Angiulli
et al., 2008) and Theorem 3.6 in (Angiulli et al., 2010)). As for recognizing
an outlier together with its witness, this problem is intractable for general
and disjunction-free default theories (Theorem 4.6 in (Angiulli et al., 2008)),
but can be solved in polynomial time if NU (as well as DNU) default theories
are considered (Angiulli et al., 2010). Regarding the latter result, it is worth
recalling that, while for both NU and DNU default theories the entailment
of a literal can be decided in polynomial time, deciding the entailment in DF
default theories is intractable (Kautz and Selman, 1991).
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3. Computational and expressive properties of NMU and NU de-
fault theories
In this section we investigate some important properties of NMU and NU
theories. Before that, it is worth pointing out that the results we shall prove
to hold for NU (DNU, resp.) theories immediately apply to DNU (NU, resp.)
theories, since given an NU (DNU, resp.) theory ∆, the dual theory ∆ of ∆
is obtained from ∆ by replacing each literal ` in ∆ with ¬` is a DNU (NU,
resp.) theory that has the same properties of its dual.
Specifically, we shall first assess to which extent the admittedly quite
simple NMU and NU default theories are powerful enough to solve (via en-
tailment) interesting computational problems, hereby indirectly answering a
long-lasting questions posed by Kautz and Selman in (Kautz and Selman,
1991). We will do so by first showing that the entailment problem on (quasi-
acyclic) NMU theories is co-NP -complete (Section 3.1), and then proving
that NU default theories (and, thereby, also NMU theories) are powerful
enough to express all decision problems included in NL (Section 3.2).
Next, Section 3.3 will present the Incremental Lemma, which provides an
interesting monotonicity characterization in NMU theories.
Then, in Section 3.4 we will prove a technical lemma which demonstrates
how the evaluation of the truth value of a CNF formula under a specific
assignment can be accomplished in a way that relates it to the definition of
outliers.
Results presented here will be exploited in the rest of the paper in order to
characterize the complexity of outlier detection problems in default theories.
3.1. The complexity of the entailment problem for NMU theories
Theorem 3.1. Let ∆ be a NMU propositional default theory and let l be a
literal. Then, the problem of telling if ∆ |= l is co-NP-complete.
Proof: (Membership) Membership in co-NP follows immediately from mem-
bership in co-NP of the entailment problem for disjunction-free propositional
default theories (Kautz and Selman, 1991).
(Hardness) Let Φ be a boolean formula in 3CNF on the set of variables
X = x1, . . . , xn, such that Φ = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cm, with Ck = tk,1 ∨ tk,2 ∨ tk,3,
and each tk,1, tk,2, tk,3 is a literal on the set X, for k = 1, . . . ,m. The default
theory ∆(Φ) = (D(Φ), ∅) is associated with Φ, where D(Φ) is D1 ∪D2 ∪D3,
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with:
D1 =
{
: xi
xi
,
: ¬xi
¬xi | i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
D2 =
{
tk,j : ck
ck
| k = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, 2, 3
}
, and
D3 =
{
: ¬ck
¬ck ,
¬ck : l
l
| k = 1, . . . ,m
}
,
where l is a new letter distinct from those occurring in Φ. It is shown next
that Φ is unsatisfiable iff ∆(Φ) |= l. We recall that the unsatisfiability
problem of a 3CNF is a well-known co-NP-complete problem. Consider a
generic extension E of ∆(Φ). From the rules in the set D1, E is such that for
each i = 1, . . . , n, either xi ∈ E or ¬xi ∈ E.
(Only If part) Suppose that Φ is unsatisfiable. Then, for each truth
assignment T on the set of variables X, there exists at least a clause, say
Cf(T ), 1 ≤ f(T ) ≤ m, that is not satisfied by T . Because of the rules in the
set D2, cf(TE∩(X∪¬X)) 6∈ E , and from rules in the set D3, ¬cf(TE∩(X∪¬X)) ∈ E
and l ∈ E .
(If part) Suppose that ∆(Φ) |= l. Then, for each extension E of ∆(Φ),
there exists g(E), 1 ≤ g(E) ≤ m, such that ¬cg(E) ∈ E . For each truth
assignment T on the set of variables X, let E(T ) denote the set containing
all the extensions E of ∆(Φ) such that E ⊇ Lit(T ). Then, for each E ∈ E(T ),
¬cg(E) ∈ E implies that none of the rules in the set D2 having cg(E) as their
conclusion belong to the set of generating defaults of E . Thus, the clause
Cg(E) is not satisfied by T . As this holds for each truth assignment T , Φ is
unsatisfiable. 
From the above result, the complexity of the entailment problem for
propositional quasi-acyclic NMU default theories can be promptly derived:
Corollary 3.2. Let ∆ be a quasi-acyclic NMU propositional default theory
and let l be a literal. Then, the problem of telling if ∆ |= l is co-NP-complete.
Proof: The statement immediately follows by noting that the theory em-
ployed in the reduction of Theorem 3.2 has tightness 1. 
For the sake of completeness, before closing this section, the cost of the
entailment problem for NU theories is recalled next.
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Proposition 3.3. (proved in (Kautz and Selman, 1991; Zohary, 2002)) Let
∆ be a NU propositional default theory and let L be a set of literals. Deciding
if ∆ |= L can be done in time O(n2), where n is the size of the theory ∆.
3.2. The Expressive Power of Normal Unary Default Theories
This section is devoted to show that, in fact, the yet very simple default
theories we mainly refer to in this paper are actually rich enough to express
interesting knowledge.
To this end, we follow the literature (see (Dantsin et al., 2001) and infor-
mally define the expressive power of a (logic) language as the set of properties
over finite structures that language allows to express. We assume an arbitrar-
ily large but finite domain of constants U to be given over which input finite
structures are defined (Cadoli et al., 1997). Here, the input finite structure
S will be assumed to be encoded into a fixed-schema completed relational
database2 dbS and, accordingly, the expression of the language in question
expressing a given property will be regarded as a query to be evaluated
against such an input database. By completed relational database we mean a
database db for which the following holds: for each relation R in db there is a
relation in db, we shall call it complement of R and denote it by R, with the
same schema as R, such that R = {t ∈ U × . . .×U | t 6∈ R}. In other words,
in a completed database, we will find, together with each relation, also its
complement with respect to active tuple domain U × . . .×U . From here one,
we shall identify the finite structure S with its completed relational encoding
dbS .
We shall say that the database dbS is ordered if its schema contains rela-
tions First, Succ and Last with the meaning of encoding a complete ordering
of all domain elements included in U .
A (boolean) query q expressed in the given language defines a generic
mapping mq that associates to each input database dbS (over the given fixed
schema) a boolean value mq(dbS) ∈ {true, false}3.
2We assume here that the reader is familiar with basic notions regarding relational
database theory. See, e.g., (Abiteboul et al., 1995) for an excellent source of material on
this topic.
3We recall that genericity means invariance under domain isomorphisms. Moreover,
we recall that queries are usually and more generally defined as mappings from databases
to databases. Here, we stick to Boolean queries as these are sufficient for foregoing pre-
sentation.
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All that given, by the expressive power of a language L we mean the set
of mappings mq for all queries q expressible in L by some query expression
E (by abusing notation, this expression is usually identified with the query
q it defines and therefore called a query itself).
Next, we relate NU default theories to queries, as follows. A NU query
form qf is a pair 〈∆qf , aqf〉, where aqf is a positive literal and ∆qf is a NU
default theory of the form (∅, Dqf ), for some set of NU defaults Dqf . A query
form defines a query over relational databases, as follows. For each database
db, letWdb be the set of (positive) literals naturally encoding db in logical form
as Wdb = {R(a) | R is a relation in db and a ∈ R}. Then, for each database
db, the query form qf defines the query qqf such that qqf (db) = true if and
only if (Wdb, Dqf )|=aqf .
Now that the mechanism relating default theories and queries over finite
structures has been established, we can discuss the expressive power of NU
default theories.
In order to asses the expressive power of the languages we are interested
in, we shall refer to descriptive complexity theory (Ebbinghaus and Flum,
1995) according to which this is measured by relating it to complexity classes.
Informally speaking, as reported in (Dantsin et al., 2001), in order to prove
that a language expresses a complexity class C one has to show that every
C-machine working on a (proper encoding of a) finite structure can be repre-
sented by an expression of the language. An alternative way to go is to show
that the language at hand is equivalent to (or subsumes) another language
whose expressive power has already been established. We will use the latter
strategy.
To this end, we consider the language datalog+, that is to say the lan-
guage datalog augmented with the possibility of specifying negated exten-
sional predicates in rule bodies (Abiteboul et al., 1995) and, specifically, the
sublanguage datalog+(1), that is, the fragment of datalog+ where each rule
has at most one intentional predicate in the body.
The following result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 8 in (Dantsin
et al., 2001).
Theorem 3.4. (cf. Theorem 8 in (Dantsin et al., 2001)) The language
datalog+(1) captures NL over finite structures encoded as completed rela-
tional databases on ordered domains.
Next, we show that the language of NU default theories is at least as ex-
pressive as datalog+(1) and, as such, expresses all NL queries over completed
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ordered databases.
Notation. In the following, in order to make the presentation more easily
followed, we shall often use theories where defaults contain variables: these
are to be inteded simply a shorthands for the set of ground (that is, propo-
sitional) defaults obtained from those by substituting in all consistent ways
variables with constants appearing in the theory.
Theorem 3.5. On completed ordered databases, NU default theories are at
least as expressive as datalog+(1).
Proof: In order to prove our result, we will show that for each datalog+(1)
program P defining, together with the letter g, the query qP over ordered
relational databases (i.e., for each database db, qP (db) = true iff P ∪Wdb|=g),
there exists a NU query form qf such that qqf coincides with qP .
While sticking with propositional defaults only, for the sake of the presen-
tation, we shall use below variables in defaults: wherever variables appear,
a default will be intended as the mere representation of the set of proposi-
tional defaults obtained by substituting in any possible consistent ways those
variables with elements from U . Moreover, references to single atom contain-
ing variables have to be intended to represent a certain propositional atom
obtained by substituting variables therein appearing with elements from U .
Let us illustrate next the translation of a generic rule included in P into
a set of defaults. Let r be the generic rule of the following form:
r ≡ p(Y)← q(X0), a1(X1), . . . , am(Xm), not am+1(Xm+1), . . . , not an(Xn), (0 ≤ m ≤ n)
where q is an intensional (i.e., non-database) predicate, and the ai denote
extensional (i.e., database) predicates (all the predicates occurring in the
body of the rule are optional).
The rule r is translated into the set of defaults Dr, consisting of the
following default rules:
• δri ≡
ai(Xi) : ¬pr(Z)
¬pr(Z) (1 ≤ i ≤ m),
• δrj ≡
aj(Xj) : ¬pr(Z)
¬pr(Z) (m+ 1 ≤ j ≤ n),
• δr0 ≡
q(X0) : pr(Z)
pr(Z)
, and
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• δr ≡ pr(Z) : p(Y)
p(Y)
.
where Z denotes the set of variables X0 ∪ . . . ∪Xn occurring in the rule r,
among which an arbitrary ordered is assumed, ai denotes the complemental
letter of ai and pr is a novel predicate name associated with the rule r.
Notice that the same translation schema as above applies to recursive
rules possibly occurring in P . Accordingly, the datalog+(1) program P is
translated into the set of defaults DP obtained by translating all its rules
into defaults.
We claim that the NU query form qf = 〈(DP , ∅), g〉 is such that, for
any finite database db, qP (db) = qqf (db). In other words, we have to show
that g belongs to the minimal model of the program resulting by adding Wdb
to P if and only if g is a cautious consequence of the NU default theory
∆P = (Wdb, DP ).
In what follows, we will refer to the defaults δri with i > 0, as extensional
defaults (since an extensional predicate occurs in their prerequisite), and to
the remaining ones, that is the defaults δr0 and δ
r, as intensional defaults
(since only intensional predicates occur in these rules).
Given a generic extension E of ∆P , let EP denote the subset of E consist-
ing of the positive literals whose extensional predicate occurs in the program
P .
In what follows, for simplicity, when we speak of the minimal model of
P ∪ WdbS , we will take into account only intensional predicates, since the
extensional component of the minimal model of P is always given by WdbS .
Consider the set E⊥ of extensions E of the default theory ∆P , having the
property that there is no intensional default preceding an extensional one in
the sequence DE of generating defaults of E.
Claim 1. The set E⊥ contains a unique extension.
Proof: Consider a generic extension E of E⊥. First of all, notice that exten-
sional defaults contain in their prerequisite only extensional predicates and
in their conclusion only literals of the form ¬pr(Z).
Since extensional defaults precede intensional ones in the sequence of
generating defaults DE associated with E, it follows that E contains all the
literals the form ¬pr(Z) occurring in at least one extensional default of ∆P
such that the extensional atom in the corresponding prerequisite is true,
say this set Neg. Due to the maximality property of extensions, Neg is the
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maximal set of negative literals that can be deduced by means of the defaults
in ∆P .
As for the positive literals occurring in E, they will be the maximal set
of positive literals that can be inferred by means of the defaults in ∆P after
that all the literals of the form ¬pr(Z) in Neg are assumed to be part of the
extension. Say this set of positive literals Pos.
Thus, all the sequences of generating defaults such that extensional de-
faults precede intensional ones lead to the same sets Neg and Pos and,
hence, to the same extension. In other words, these sequences are equiva-
lent, in terms of the extension that they produce, up to permutations that
preserve the property that extensional defaults precede intensional ones.
Thus, it can be concluded that all the extensions in E⊥ must coincide,
and E⊥ contains one single extension. 
In the following, with a little abuse of notation, we will denote by E⊥ the
only extension belonging to E⊥.
The following result states that E⊥P represents the set of all and only the
intensional atoms entailed by the theory ∆P .
Claim 2. Let g be an extensional atom. Then, ∆P |=g if and only if g ∈ E⊥P .
Proof: From what stated in Claim 1, since Neg is the maximal set of nega-
tive literals that can be inferred from ∆P , it follows that the set Pos, consist-
ing of the positive intensional literals contained in E⊥, is contained in every
extension of ∆P . 
It remains to show that the minimal model of P ∪WdbS coincides with
E⊥P . We preliminarily need to prove a further technical result.
Let P be a datalog(1) program over a ordered completed database db.
Consider the program P db obtained from P by (1) deleting all the rules whose
body is falsified by at least one extensional atom in db, and (2) removing all
the occurrences of extensional atoms in the remaining rules.
Claim 3. The minimal model MM(P∪db) of P∪db coincides with MM(P db)∪
db, where MM(P db) denotes the minimal model of P db.
Proof: Let I ′ be a generic interpretation of P db. The interpretation I =
I ′ ∪ db is such that the rules whose body is falsified by an extensional atom
in db are true in I.
As for the remaining rules, consider a generic interpretation I of P ∪ db
and a rule r of P . Let r′ denote the rule r obtained from r by removing all
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the occurrences of extensional atoms therein appearing. It can be verified
that r is true in I if and only if r′ is true in I ′ = I \ db.
Thus, it can be concluded that there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween models of M of P ∪ db and models M ′ = M \ db of P db, from which
the theorem statement immediately follows. 
Now, notice that by definition of E⊥, for any rule r falsified by an exten-
sional atom, the literal ¬pr(Z) belongs to E⊥. Hence, it follows that Pos,
the set of all and only the positive literals occurring in E⊥, coincides with
the unique extension of the default theory (DdbP , ∅), with DdbP consisting of
the intensional default rules associated with rules r belonging to P db. More-
over, since the positive literals pr(Z) are distinguished atoms, each associated
with a different rule r, the set of defaults DdbP is equivalent in its turn to the
set Ddb
′
P obtained from D
db
P by substituting each pair of defaults of the form
q(X0):pr(Z)
pr(Z)
, pr(Z):p(Y)
p(Y)
with the default q(X0):p(Y)
p(Y)
.
The last step consists in showing that the unique extension of (Ddb
′
P , ∅)
coincides with the minimal model of P db. Since no negative literal occur in
(Ddb
′
P , ∅), then its extension must coincide with the minimal model of the
logic program P ′ obtained by mapping each default q(X0):p(Y)
p(Y)
in Ddb
′
P to the
rule p(Y)← q(X0). The result follows, since the program P ′ is exactly P db.
Thus, the minimal model of P ∪WdbS coincides with E⊥P , and this concludes
the proof. 
To provide an example of the translation exploited in Theorem 3.5, we
next consider the reachability problem: given a graphG, encoded in a database
dbG by means of the binary relation arc(X, Y ) (representing the fact that
there exits an arc in G from the generic node X to the generic node Y ), and
two nodes s and t of G, decide whether t is reachable from s in G or not,
that is to say, decide if there exists a path joining s with t in G.
The following datalog+(1) program
P :

r1 : path(X, Y )← arc(X, Y )
r2 : path(X, Y )← path(X,Z), arc(Z, Y )
can be employed to solve the reachability problem, since it holds that P ∪
dbG|=path(s, t) if and only if t is reachable from s inG. According to Theorem
3.5, the rule r1 is translated into the following defaults:
δr11 ≡
arc(X, Y ) : ¬path1(X, Y )
¬path1(X, Y ) , δ
r1
0 ≡
: path1(X, Y )
path1(X, Y )
, and
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δr1 ≡ path1(X, Y ) : path(X, Y )
path(X, Y )
,
while the rule r2 is translated into the following defaults:
δr21 ≡
arc(Z, Y ) : ¬path2(X,Z, Y )
¬path2(X,Z, Y ) , δ
r2
0 ≡
path(X,Z) : path2(X,Z, Y )
path2(X,Z, Y )
, and
δr2 ≡ path2(X,Z, Y ) : path(X, Y )
path(X, Y )
,
and the corresponding NU query form qf is qf = 〈(Dqf ,WdbG), path(s, t)〉,
with Dqf the defaults as above. The propositional version of qf can be
obtained, once the finite domain of constants U is given, by substituting
variables with the constants of U in all the possible consistent ways.
Observation. For the sake of completeness, we note that, actually, NU default
theories are capable of simulating a limited form of conjunction and negation
that could possibly appear in datalog rules. More precisely, it is possible to
correctly deal with the language datalog+(1), a generalization of datalog
where the negation of extensional predicates are allowed to occur in rule
bodies. Notice, however, that the translation does not deal with the problem
of generating complement relations on their own, so that to represent input
finite structures via completed databases is needed.
3.3. The Incremental Lemma
This section is devoted to proving the Incremental Lemma, which is
the basic result used to single out tractable cases of outlier detection prob-
lems. Alongside, the Incremental Lemma provides an interesting monotonic-
ity characterization in NMU theories which is valuable on its own.
Definition 3.6 (Proof). Let ∆ = (D,W ) be an NMU default theory, let l
be a literal and E a set of literals. A proof of l w.r.t. ∆ and E is either l
by itself, if l ∈ W , or a sequence of defaults δ1, ..., δn, such that the following
holds: (1) l is the consequence of δn, (2) ¬l 6∈ E, and (3) for each δi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
either δi is prerequisite-free, or pre(δi) ∈ W , or δ1, ..., δi−1 is a proof of pre(δi)
w.r.t. ∆ and E. A proof is minimal if it is not possible to make it shorter
by deleting a default from it.
Lemma 3.7. (Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter, 1994) Let ∆ = (D,W ) be an NMU
default theory, let l be a literal and E an extension of ∆. Then l is in E iff
there is a proof of l w.r.t. ∆ and E.
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Definition 3.8 (Satisfaction of an NMU default). A set of literals E
satisfies an NMU default δ = y:x
x
iff at least one of the following three condi-
tions hold: (1) y 6∈ E, or (2) ¬x ∈ E, or (3) x ∈ E.
Theorem 3.9. (Ben-Eliyahu and Dechter, 1994) A set of literals E is an
extension of an NMU consistent default theory (D,W ) iff the following holds:
(1) W ⊆ E, (2) E satisfies every default in D, and (3) every literal in E has
a proof w.r.t (D,W ) and E.
The Incremental Lemma, reported below, characterizes a monotonic behavior
of NMU theories.
Lemma 3.10 (The Incremental Lemma). Let (D,W ) be an NMU de-
fault theory, q a literal and S a set of literals such that W ∪ S is consistent
and S does not influence q in (D,W ). Then the following hold:
Monotonicity of brave reasoning If q is in some extension of (D,W ) then q
is in some extension of (D,W ∪ S).
Monotonicity of skeptical reasoning If q is in every extension of (D,W ) then
q is in every extension of (D,W ∪ S).
Proof: (Monotonicity of brave reasoning) Suppose that for some exten-
sion E ′ of (D,W ), q ∈ E ′, and let σ = δ1, ..., δk be a proof of q w.r.t (D,W )
and E ′. Let Eσ be an extension of ∆ = (σ,W ∪ S). We will show that σ is
also a proof of q w.r.t. ∆ and Eσ. Clearly each prefix of σ is a proof w.r.t
(D,W ) and E ′. We prove that each prefix is also a proof w.r.t. ∆ and Eσ.
The proof is by induction on the size of the prefix.
Case the prefix is of size 1 In this case, the proof is either a literal that
belongs to W , or a default of the form l : t/t, where l ∈ W and t
is a literal. If the proof is a literal that belongs to W , it obviously
belongs also to W ∪ S. Suppose the consequence of δ is some literal t.
It cannot be the case that a default having a consequence ¬t belongs
to σ because σ is a proof and δ is in σ. It also cannot be the case that
¬t ∈ W because σ is a proof w.r.t. (D,W ). Last, it also cannot be
the case that ¬t ∈ S because S does not influence q in (D,W ) and δ
is part of the proof of q w.r.t. (D,W ) and E ′. Hence δ is applicable in
Eσ, and so t ∈ Eσ.
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Case the prefix is of size greater than 1 Suppose δ is the last default
in the prefix. If δ has a prerequisite l, then by the induction hypothesis,
l ∈ Eσ. Suppose the consequence of δ is some literal t. By arguments
similar to the induction base case, δ is applicable in Eσ, and so t ∈ Eσ.
Since σ ⊆ D, by semi-monotonicity of normal default theories, there is an
extension E of (D,W ∪ S) such that Eσ ⊆ E. Since q ∈ Eσ, q ∈ E.
(Monotonicity of skeptical reasoning) Suppose that q is in every
extension of (D,W ) and assume conversely that there is an extension E ′ of
(D,W ∪ S) such that q /∈ E ′. Let σ = δ1, ..., δn be a sequence of generating
defaults of E ′ as defined in Lemma 2.5. σ will be modified so that it will not
have defaults with consequences that are influenced by S. This is done as
follows:
1. Delete from σ all rules of the form : l/l or t : l/l where l belongs to S.
2. For h = 1 to n, if δh was not deleted in the previous step and the
prerequisite of δh is not in W and not a consequence of any default
which is before δh in σ and was not deleted, then delete δh from σ.
Let σS be the sequence of defaults left in σ after the modification described
above. Let Eσ be an extension of (σS,W ).
Claim 4. For every default δ in σS, the consequence of δ is in Eσ.
Proof: By induction on the index of δ in the sequence σS.
Case the index of δ is 1 If δ has a prerequisite l then, by construction of
σS, l must belong to W . Suppose the consequence of δ is some literal t.
It cannot be the case that a default having a consequence ¬t belongs to
σS because σS is a subset of a set of generating defaults and δ is in σS.
It also cannot be the case that ¬t ∈ W because σS is a subset of the
generating defaults of (D,W ∪S) and δ is in σS. Hence, δ is applicable
in Eσ, and so t ∈ Eσ.
Case the index of δ is greater than 1 By the induction hypothesis, if δ
has a prerequisite, it has to belong to Eσ. By arguments similar to the
ones given in the induction base part, the consequence of δ belongs to
Eσ.
By semi-monotonicity of normal default theories, there is an extension E
of (D,W ) such that Eσ ⊆ E. By the assumption that q belongs to every
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extension of (D,W ), q ∈ E. Then, by Lemma 3.7, there is a sequence of
defaults pi = δ1, ..., δk such that pi is a proof of q w.r.t. (D,W ) and E. Since
q /∈ E ′, for some 1 ≤ j ≤ k, δj /∈ σS. Let i be the minimum index such that
δi ∈ pi and δi /∈ σS. It must be the case that δi = l : t/t where l might be
empty. We now consider two cases.
Case δi is applicable in E
′ If this is the case, δi is one of the generating
defaults of E ′ or, in other words, δi ∈ σ. Since δi /∈ σS, and δi ∈ σ,
it must be the case that S influences t in (D,W ). But δi is a default
in a proof of q w.r.t. (D,W ) and E, so S influences q in (D,W ), a
contradiction.
Case δi is not applicable in E
′ Since i is the minimal index such that
δi /∈ σS, it must be the case that ¬t belongs to E ′ (for, otherwise, δi
would have been in the generating defaults of E ′, and since S does not
influence t in D, δi would belong to σS). Since δi = l : t/t is part of
a proof of q w.r.t. (D,W ) and E, it must be the case that ¬t /∈ W .
Clearly, since S does not influence t in (D,W ), ¬t is not in S either.
But δi is not applicable in E
′, which is an extension of (D,W ∪ S),
so there must be a rule δ ∈ D such that δ is applicable in E ′ and the
consequence of δ is ¬t. So δ is one of the generating defaults of E ′.
Since S does not influence t in D, δ must belong to σS. By Claim 4
above, ¬t belongs to Eσ, and by semi-monotonicity, ¬t belongs to E.
So δi = l : t/t cannot be part of a proof of q w.r.t. (D,W ) and E, a
contradiction.

3.4. On CNF evaluation and the definition of outlier
The lemma introduced next shows how the evaluation of the truth value
of a CNF formula under a specific assignment can be accomplished in a way
that relates it to the definition of outlier.
Let T be a truth assignment to the set x1, . . . , xn of boolean variables.
Then Lit(T ) denotes the set of literals {`1, . . . , `n}, such that `i is xi if
T (xi) = true and it is ¬xi if T (xi) = false, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Let L be a consistent set of literals. Then TL denotes the truth assignment
to the set of letters (boolean variables) occurring in L such that, for each
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positive literal p ∈ L, TL(p) = true, and for each negative literal ¬p ∈ L,
TL(p) = false.
Lemma 3.11 below states the connection between the evaluation of the
truth value of a CNF formula under a specific assignment and the definition
of outliers.
Lemma 3.11. For each boolean formula Φ in 3CNF having m conjuncts,
there exists a NU propositional default theory (D(Φ),W (Φ)) whose size is
polinomially bounded in Φ, a set of literals S(Φ) ⊆ W (Φ), and a set of
letters c1, . . . , cm occurring in D(Φ), such that Φ is satisfiable if and only if
(D(Φ),W (Φ)S(Φ)) |= ¬(S(Φ) ∪ {c1, . . . , cm}).
Proof: Let Φ = f(X) be a boolean formula in 3CNF, where X = x1, . . . , xn
is a set of variables, and f(X) = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cm, with Cj = tj,1 ∨ tj,2 ∨ tj,3,
and each tj,1, tj,2, tj,3 is a literal on the set X, for j = 1, . . . ,m. Let ∆(Φ) =
(D(Φ),W (Φ)) be a NU default theory associated with Φ, where W (Φ) is the
set {x1, . . . , xn} of letters and D(Φ) is the set of defaults D1∪D2∪D3, with:
D1 =
{
δ
(1)
1,i =
xi : ¬yi
¬yi , δ
(1)
2,i =
: yi
yi
| i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
D2 =
{
δ
(2)
j,k =
σ(tj,k) : ¬cj
¬cj | j = 1, . . . ,m; k = 1, 2, 3
}
,
D3 =
{
δ
(3)
1,i =
: ¬xi
¬xi | i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
where c1, . . ., cm and y1, . . ., yn are new letters distinct from those occurring
in Φ, and σ(xi) = xi and σ(¬xi) = yi, for i = 1, . . . , n. Let R be a subset of
{x1, . . . , xn}. In the rest of the proof, σ(R) will denote the set {σ(x) | x ∈ R}.
Moreover, σ−1 will denote the inverse of σ, that is to say σ−1(xi) = xi and
σ(yi) = ¬xi, and σ−1(R) = {σ−1(x) | x ∈ R}.
Next, it is shown that there exists a set of literals S(Φ) ⊂ W (Φ) such that
(D(Φ),W (Φ)S(Φ)) |= ¬(S(Φ) ∪ {c1, . . . , cm}) if and only if Φ is satisfiable.
First, the following claims are proved.
Claim 5. Let S ⊆ W (Φ). For each extension E of (D(Φ),W (Φ)S) it is the
case that
• for each xi ∈ S, ¬xi ∈ E and yi ∈ E, and
• for each xi 6∈ S, xi ∈ E.
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Proof of Claim 5: Any extension E of (D(Φ),W (Φ)S) is such that (i) for
each xi ∈ S, xi 6∈ E and ¬xi ∈ E , since xi 6∈ W (Φ)S, no letter xi appears in
the consequence of a default in D(Φ), and due to defaults δ
(3)
1,i ; (ii) for each
xi ∈ S, yi ∈ E , due to defaults δ(1)2,i ; and (iii) for each xi 6∈ S, xi ∈ E , since
xi ∈ W (Φ)S. 
Claim 6. Let S ⊆ W (Φ). Then, there exists an extension E∗ of (D(Φ),W (Φ)S)
such that
• for each xi ∈ S, ¬xi ∈ E∗ and yi ∈ E∗, and
• for each xi 6∈ S, xi ∈ E∗ and ¬yi ∈ E∗.
Proof of Claim 6: Note that for each xi 6∈ S either ¬yi ∈ E (due to defaults
δ
(1)
1,i ) or yi ∈ E (due to defaults δ(1)2,i ). The proof then follows from Claim 5.

We next resume to the main Lemma proof.
(If part) Assume that a subset S(Φ) ⊆ W (Φ) exists such that (D(Φ),
W (Φ)S(Φ)) |= ¬(S(Φ) ∪ {c1, . . . , cm}). Note that the set S(Φ) may contain
some letters from the set {x1, . . . , xn}. Further, the defaults in the set D1
serve the purpose of introducing the letters yi in the current extension of the
theory (D(Φ),W (Φ)S). In particular, the letter yi is intended to represent
the negation of letter xi and it is introduced since in NU theories negated
literals cannot be specified as the prerequisite of a default.
Moreover, the defaults in the set D2 evaluate the CNF formula Φ by
using the truth value assignment encoded by the letters xi and yi belonging
to the current extension of the theory (D(Φ),W (Φ)S). In particular, if the
jth conjunct Cj of Φ is true, then the literal ¬cj belongs to the current
extension.
By Claim 6, there exists an exension E∗ of (D(Φ),W (Φ)S) such that the
set of literals R = σ−1(E∗ ∩ (X ∪ Y )) is consistent and precisely encodes a
truth value assignment for the variables in the set X, namely TR.
To conclude, since (D(Φ),W (Φ)S) |= ¬c1 ∧ . . . ∧ ¬cm, by the defaults in
the set D2, TR is a truth value assignment to the variables in the set X that
makes the formula f(X) true and, hence, Φ is satisfiable.
(Only If part) Assume now that the formula Φ is satisfiable, and let TX
be a truth value assignment to the variables in the set X that makes f(X)
true. Next, we prove that for S(Φ) = {xi | TX(xi) = false} it holds that
(D(Φ),W (Φ)S(Φ)) |= ¬(S(Φ) ∪ {c1, . . . , cm}).
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Figure 2: The atomic dependency graph of the theory ∆′(Φ) in Theorem 5.2.
Let E be a generic extension of (D(Φ),W (Φ)S(Φ)). As for the letters xi
belonging to S(Φ), due to defaults δ
(3)
1,i , ¬xi belongs to E .
It remains to show that ¬cj ∈ E , for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. By Claim 5,
for each extension E of (D(Φ),W (Φ)S(Φ)), the set Q = E∗ ∩ (X ∪ Y ) is a
superset of σ(Lit(TX)). That it to say, it might be the case that both xi and
yi are in the set Q, for a letter xi not in S(Φ).
Since the defaults in the set D2 encode the boolean formula obtained from
Φ by substituting each negative literal ¬xi with the positive literal yi, having
both xi and yi in Q corresponds to assuming that both the literals xi and
¬xi are, so as to say, true within Φ.
Indeed, as already observed, Φ is evaluated by means of a different for-
mula, say Φ′, obtained from Φ by substituting each occurrence of the negated
literal ¬xi with the letter yi (see the defaults in D2). If the literals in Q form
a superset of the literals associated with a truth value assignment making
Φ true, they also encode a satisfying truth assignment that makes the for-
mula Φ′ true. Thus, by virtue of the defaults in D2, each extension E of
(D(Φ),W (Φ)S(Φ)) is such that ¬cj belongs to E , for j = 1, . . . ,m. 
4. The tractabilty/intractability frontier for Outlier-Witness Recog-
nition
This section is devoted to the problem Outlier-Witness Recognition, that
is, given default theory ∆ = (W,D) and two disjoint sets L and S of literals
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from W , is it true that L is an outlier in ∆ with witness S?. We begin by
recalling the following result from (Angiulli et al., 2010):
Theorem 4.1 (from (Angiulli et al., 2010)). Over NU default theories,
the problem Outlier-Witness Recognition is solvable in polynomial time.
Therefore, in order to draw the sought frontier, it remains to show the
intractability of Outlier-Witness Recognition in a language setting which is
(possibly only slightly) more general than that of NU theories, which is pro-
vided by the following result which considers the least general NMU theories.
Theorem 4.2. Over quasi-acyclic NMU default theories, the problem Outlier-
Witness Recognition is co-NP-hard.
Proof: The proof is obtained via a reduction of the entailment problem
for quasi-acyclic NMU theories which was proved to be co-NP-complete in
Section 3.2 above. Consider an instance of the entailment problem relative
to a quasi-acyclic NMU theory ∆ = (W,D) and one single literal l. Consider,
now, the theory
∆′ = (D′,W ′) =
(
W ∪ {¬f, g}, D ∪
{
: ¬g
¬g ;
¬g : ¬f
¬f ;
l : l′
l′
;
l′ : f
f
})
,
where f , g and l′ are letters not occurring in ∆. Clearly, ∆′ is quasi-acyclic
NMU and can be constructed in time polynomial in the size of ∆.
Now we have: ∆ |= l implies ∆′ |= l that, in turn, implies ∆′ |= l′. From
this, it follows that that (D′,W ′{¬f}) |= f and, since (D′,W ′{¬f},{g}) |= ¬g, we
also have (D′,W ′{¬f},{g} 6|= f , which finally means that {g} is an outlier set
in ∆′ with witness {¬f}.
As for the opposite direction, assume that {g} is an outlier set in ∆′ with
witness {¬f}. This means that (D′,W ′{¬f}) |= f holds. Therefore, since
neither f nor g occur in ∆, by minimality, this implies in turn that ∆ |= l′
and, finally, that ∆ |= l. This completes the proof. 
5. The tractabilty/intractability frontier for Outlier Recognition
This section deals with the problem Outlier Recognition, that is, given
default theory ∆ = (W,D) and a set L of literals from W , is there any set
S of literals from W , disjoint from L, such that L is an outlier in ∆ with
witness S?.
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The section is organized as follows. Section 5.1 considers the Outlier
Recognition problem over quasi-acyclic NU theories. Section 5.2 introduces
the notion of strong outlier. Subsequent Section 5.3 studies the Outlier-
Witness recognition problem on the notion of strong outlier. Finally, Section
5.4 takes into account the complexity of the Outlier Recognition problem on
strong outliers both on cyclic and quasi-acyclic NU theories.
5.1. General outliers and the Outlier Recognition problem
We begin, as in Section 4, by recalling a theorem from (Angiulli et al.,
2010), but this time one stating an intractability result:
Theorem 5.1 (from (Angiulli et al., 2010)). Over NU default theories,
the problem Outlier Recognition is NP-complete.
By exploiting the result proved in Section 3.4, it is possible to sharpen
the result presented above by showing that Outlier Recognition remains in-
tractable even over the (quite simple) class of quasi-acyclic NU theories,
which is proven next.
Theorem 5.2. Outlier Recognition for quasi-acyclic NU default theories is
NP-complete.
Proof: (Membership) Membership in NP immediately follows from Theorem
3.6 of (Angiulli et al., 2010).
(Hardness) Let Φ be a boolean formula in 3CNF (as described in Lemma
3.11). Checking 3CNF formulae satisfiability is a well known NP-complete
problem. (Papadimitriou, 1994).
Consider the default theory (D(Φ),W (Φ)) described in the proof of Lemma
3.11. In order to prove the NP-hardness of the problem at hand, the NU de-
fault theory ∆′(Φ) = (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)) is associated with Φ, where W ′(Φ) is
the set
W (Φ) ∪ {¬l, c0, c1, . . . , cm}
of letters, with l, c0, c1, . . . , cm being new letters distinct from those occurring
in Φ, and D′(Φ) is the set of defaults D(Φ) ∪D4 ∪D5 ∪D6, with:
D4 =
{
δ
(4)
1,i =
xi : ¬c0
¬c0 , δ
(4)
2,i =
yi : ¬c0
¬c0 | i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
D5 =
{
δ
(5)
j =
cj : c0
c0
| j = 1, . . . ,m
}
, and
D6 =
{
δ
(6)
1 =
: l
l
, δ
(6)
2 =
l : c0
c0
}
.
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The theory ∆′(Φ) can be built in polynomial time and, moreover, W ′(Φ) is
consistent.
Now we can observe that the theory ∆′(Φ) has tightness equal to 1 — the
atomic dependency graph of ∆′(Φ) is shown in Figure 2. Next, it is shown
that L = {¬l} is an outlier in ∆′(Φ) if and only if Φ is satisfiable.
(Only If part) Assume that L = {¬l} is an outlier in ∆′(Φ). Since L is
an outlier, there exists an outlier witness set S ⊆ W ′(Φ) \ L for L.
Now we show that the set S contains all the literals in the set {c0, c1,
. . ., cm}. The only literal of W ′(Φ) \ L whose negation is not entailed by
(D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S,L) is c0, since this theory entails c0 by the defaults in D6.
Thus, c0 belongs to S, for otherwise {¬l} would not be an outlier set. Since
(D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) |= ¬S and c0 ∈ S, by the defaults in D5, S contains the set
{c0, c1, . . . , cm}, for otherwise (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) |= ¬c0 cannot be true.
Let C be {c1, . . . , cm} and let R be S\(C∪{c0}). Next we show that there
does not exist an extension E of (D(Φ),W (Φ)R) such that E 6⊇ ¬(R ∪ C)
and, hence, that (D(Φ),W (Φ)R) |= ¬(R ∪ C).
First, note that W ′(Φ)S equals W (Φ)R ∪ {¬l}, while D(Φ) ⊆ D′(Φ).
Since, ¬l does not occur in any default of the theory (D(Φ),W (Φ)) and
since ¬l occurs in W ′(Φ), then the semi-monotonic relationship still holds
between theories (D(Φ),W (Φ)R) and (D
′(Φ),W ′(Φ)R′).
Assume that there exists an extension E of (D(Φ),W (Φ)R) such that
E 6⊇ ¬(R∪C). Then, there exists either a literal ¬xi′ 6∈ E (i′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}) or
a literal ¬cj′ 6∈ E (j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}). Moreover, by semi-monotonicity, there
exists an extension E ′ of (D′(Φ),W (Φ)S) such that E ′ ⊇ E . However, since
no literal ¬xi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and ¬cj (1 ≤ j ≤ m) occur in any default in
the set D4 ∪D5 ∪D6, the missing literal (xi′ or cj′) does not belong to E ′ as
well and (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) 6|= ¬S, a contradiction. Thus, it can be concluded
that (D(Φ),W (Φ)R) |= ¬(R ∪ C) and, by Lemma 3.11, that the formula Φ
is satisfiable.
(If part) Assume now that the formula Φ is satisfiable. Then, by Lemma
3.11, there exists a set of literalsR ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn} such that (D(Φ),W (Φ)R) |=
¬(R ∪ C).
Let S be R ∪ C ∪ {c0}. We show next that (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) |= ¬S.
By semi-monotonicity, it follows that there exists at least one extension E ′
of (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) such that E ′ ⊇ ¬(R ∪ C). Moreover, since no literal
occurring in the set of defaults D(Φ) also occurs in the consequence of any
default in D4 ∪ D5 ∪ D6, each extension E ′ of (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) is such that
E ′ ⊇ ¬(R ∪C). Then, for each extension E ′ of (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S), there exists
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at least one letter xi or yi in E ′. Indeed, if xi 6∈ S, then xi ∈ E ′. Otherwise,
y1, . . . , yn ∈ E ′. Thus, by virtue of the defaults in the set D4, the literal ¬c0
belongs to E ′. It can be concluded that (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) |= ¬S.
Consider now the theory (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S,{¬l}). By virtue of the defaults
in the set D6, there exists at least one extension E ′ of this theory such that
c0 ∈ E ′ and, thus, (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S,{¬l}) 6|= ¬S. In other words, L = {¬l} is
an outlier set with associated outlier witness set S in ∆′(Φ). 
Unfortunately, the theorem reported above confirms that detecting out-
liers, even in default theories as structurally simple as quasi-acyclic NU ones,
remains intractable. Therefore, unless one is interested in looking into even
simpler fragments of default logics, in order to attain tractability, it is neces-
sary to resort to a stronger notion of outlier, allowing to single out a strict,
yet interesting, subset of the outlier as captured by the general definition we
have used up to this point. This stronger notion is introduced next.
5.2. Strong outliers
In order to introduce strong outliers, we preliminarily notice that condi-
tions 1 and 2 of the Definition 2.6 can be rephrased as follows:
1. (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS) |= ¬`, and
2. (∃` ∈ S)(D,WS,L) 6|= ¬`.
In other words, condition 1 states that the negation of every literal ` ∈ S
must be entailed by (D,WS) while, according to condition 2, it is sufficient
that just one literal ` ∈ S exists whose negation is not entailed by (D,WS,L).
In order to strengthen this definition, it is therefore natural (and, as we
shall show, enough) to modify Condition 2, thereby obtaining the following
definition of strong outlier set.
Definition 5.3 (Strong Outlier). Let ∆ = (D,W ) be a propositional de-
fault theory and let L ⊂ W be a set of literals. If there exists a non-empty
subset S of WL such that:
1. (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS) |= ¬`, and
2. (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS,L) 6|= ¬`
then L is a strong outlier set in ∆ and S is a strong outlier witness set for
L in ∆.
The following proposition shows that strong outliers indeed form a subset of
outliers and is immediately proved:
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Proposition 5.4. If L is a strong outlier set and W its strong witness, then
L is an outlier set and W its witness.
Note that, in general the converse of Proposition 5.4 does not hold.
An abstract example is presented below that provides some intuition
about cases in which the newly introduced notion of strong outlier admit-
tedly fits better than general outliers (the reader is referred to (Angiulli et al.,
2008) for compelling examples of application for general outliers). Consider
a default theory ∆ = (D,W ) where D is the set of defaults{
a1 : b1
b1
,
a2 : b2
b2
, . . . ,
an : bn
bn
}
,
and W is the set of observations {a1, a2, ...., an,¬b1, ...,¬bn}.
According to the standard definition of outlier, we get that for any pos-
sible nonempty subset L of {a1, a2, ..., an} and any nonempty subset S of
{¬b1,¬b2, ...,¬bn} that includes at least one literal ¬bi with ai ∈ L, S is a
witness for L being an outlier. So, even if a certain default
aj :bj
bj
is not related
to another default ak:bk
bk
, with j 6= k (for example, one is about birds, the
other is about students), anyway {¬bj,¬bk} is a witness set for the outlier
set {aj}.
Vice versa, strong outliers establish a closer correspondence between the
outliers and their witness sets. In the example above, the set {¬bj,¬bk} is
not a strong witness for {aj}, but {¬bj} is.
5.3. Strong outliers and the Outlier-Witness Recognition Problem
In order to mark the tractability landscape of the Strong Outlier Detection
problems, we preliminarily provide two results, the former one regarding the
tractability of the outlier-witness recognition problem and the latter one
pertaining to its intractability
Lemma 5.5. Strong Outlier-Witness Recognition on propositional NU de-
fault theories is in P.
Proof: The proof is immediate since the statement follows from the defi-
nition of strong outlier set (Definition 5.3) and the fact that the entailment
problem on propositional NU default theories is polynomial time solvable (as
proved in (Kautz and Selman, 1991; Zohary, 2002)). 
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Lemma 5.6. Strong Outlier-Witness Recognition on propositional DF de-
fault theories is NP-hard.
Proof: The statement follows from the reduction employed in Theorem
4.6 of (Angiulli et al., 2008), where it is proved that given two DF default
theories ∆1 = (D1, ∅) and ∆2 = (D2, ∅), and two letters s1 and s2, the
problem q of deciding whether ((∆1 |= s1) ∧ (∆2 |= s2)) is valid can be
reduced to the outlier-witness problem; that is, to the problem of deciding
whether L = {s2} is an outlier having witness set S = {¬s1} in the theory
∆(q), where ∆(q) = (D(q),W (q)) is the propositional DF default theory with
D(q) = { s2∧α:β
β
| α:β
β
∈ D1} ∪ D2 and W (q) = {¬s1, s2}. Since the former
problem is NP-hard, it follows from the reduction that the latter problem is
NP-hard as well. In order to complete the proof, we note that a singleton
witness set is always a strong witness set and, hence, the above reduction
immediately applies to strong outliers as well. 
5.4. Strong outliers and the Outlier Recognition Problem
Now that we have introduced the notion of strong outlier, we are ready to
study the implication of adopting such stronger notion on the complexity of
the problem Outlier Recognition. First of all, using most of the technical ma-
chinery presented in previous section, we are able to prove a first tractability
result concerning this outlier detection problem, as shown in the following.
We begin by presenting a further technical lemma, which provides a char-
acterization of minimal strong outlier witness sets in propositional NMU
theories,
Lemma 5.7. Let (D,W ) be a consistent NMU default theory and let L be a
set of literals in W . Then L is a strong outlier set in (D,W ) iff there exists
an outlier witness set S for L in (D,W ) such that letter(S) is a subset of a
SCC in the atomic dependency graph of (D,W ).
Proof: Let L be a set of literals in W and let S be an outlier witness set for
L in (D,W ). By definition, the following must be true:
1. (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS) |= ¬`, and
2. (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS,L) 6|= ¬`.
We can partition S into disjoint sets S1, . . . , Sn such that the following holds:
1.
⋃n
i=1Si = S.
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2. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if l and q are in S then l ∈ Si and q ∈ Si if and only
if letter(l) and letter(q) are in the same SCC in the atomic dependency
graph of (D,W ).
3. For each q, l ∈ S and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, if l ∈ Si and q ∈ Sj
for some 2 ≤ j ≤ n such that i < j, then there is no path in the
atomic dependency graph from letter(q) to letter(l) (that is, the Si’s
are ordered according to the the reachability relationship induced on
the the atomic dependency graph).
Next we show that the following holds:
1. (∀` ∈ S1)(D,WS1) |= ¬`, and
2. (∀` ∈ S1)(D,WS1,L) 6|= ¬`.
That means that S1 is a strong outlier witness set for L. Since S1 is a subset
of an SCC in the atomic dependency graph of (D,W ) this will complete the
proof.
We first consider the condition (∀` ∈ S1)(D,WS1) |= ¬`. It is given
that (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS) |= ¬`. In other words, (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS1,...,Sn) |= ¬`
so that clearly (∀` ∈ S1)(D,WS1,...,Sn) |= ¬`. Since there is no path in
the atomic dependency graph from any letter of a literal in S2, . . . , Sn to a
letter of a literal in S1, we can use the Incremental Lemma to conclude that
(∀` ∈ S1)(D,WS1) |= ¬`.
Now consider the condition (∀` ∈ S1)(D,WS1,L) 6|= ¬`. Since (∀` ∈
S)(D,WS,L) 6|= ¬`, clearly (∀` ∈ S1)(D,WS,L) 6|= ¬`. Note that it cannot be
the case that ∃` ∈ S1 such that (D,WS,L) 6|= ¬` but (D,WS,L∪{S2, ..., Sn}) |=
¬`, since there is no path in the atomic dependency graph from S2, . . . , Sn
to S1. Hence (∀` ∈ S1), (D,WS,L ∪ {S2, ..., Sn}) 6|= ¬` or, equivalently, (∀` ∈
S1)(D,WS1,L) 6|= ¬`. 
Armed with the above result, we are now able to prove the following:
Theorem 5.8. Strong Outlier Recognition for NU quasi-acyclic default the-
ories is in P.
Proof: Given a NU default theory (D,W ) of tightness c and a set of literals
L from W , by Lemma 5.7 a minimal outlier witness set S for L in (D,W )
has a size of at most c, since c is the maximum size of an SCC in the atomic
dependency graph of (D,W ). Thus, the strong outlier recognition problem
can be decided by solving the strong outlier-witness recognition problem for
each subset S of literals in WL having a size of at most c. Since the latter
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problem is polynomial time solvable (by Theorem 5.5) and since the number
of times it has to be evaluated, that is O(|W |c), is polynomially related to
the size of the input, then the procedure solves the strong outlier recognition
problem in polynomial time. 
Therefore, on the one side now we know that strong outlier recognition
can be attained in polynomial time over quasi-acyclic NU theories and, on
the other side, we know that (general) outlier recognition is intractable over
the same kind of theories. Therefore, the natural question arises of whether
theorem 5.8 can be strengthened as to refer to more general forms of theories.
The following result demonstrate that this is unfortunately not the case.
Theorem 5.9. Strong Outlier Recognition for NU (cyclic) default theories
is NP-complete.
Proof: (Membership) Since strong outliers are a subset of general outliers,
the result immediately follows from Theorem 3.6 of (Angiulli et al., 2010).
(Hardness) The proof refers, again, to the satisfiability problem for 3CNF.
Let Φ be one such a formula and consider the default theory (D(Φ),W (Φ))
described in the proof of Lemma 3.11. In order to prove the NP-hardness
of the problem at hand, the NU default theory ∆′(Φ) = (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)) is
associated with Φ, where W ′(Φ) is the set
W (Φ) ∪ {¬l, c1, . . . , cm}
of letters, with l, c1, . . . , cm being new letters distinct from those occurring
in Φ, and D′(Φ) is the set of defaults D(Φ) ∪D4 ∪D5 ∪D6, with:
D4 =
{
δ
(4)
i =
f : xi
xi
, | i = 1, . . . , n
}
,
D5 =
{
δ
(5)
1,j =
cj : f
f
, δ
(5)
2,j =
f : cj
cj
| j = 1, . . . ,m
}
, and
D6 =
{
δ
(6)
1 =
: l
l
, δ
(6)
2 =
l : f
f
| j = 1, . . . ,m
}
.
The theory ∆′(Φ) can be built in polynomial time and, moreover, W ′(Φ) is
consistent. Because of the defaults in the set D4, the theory ∆
′(Φ) is cyclic.
Next it is shown that L = {¬l} is a strong outlier in ∆′(Φ) if and only if
Φ is satisfiable. The following claim will be useful towards this end.
35
Claim 7. Let R be a subset of W ′(Φ). If there exists an extension E of
(D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)R) such that the letter f belongs to E then, for each ` ∈ R \
{¬l}, (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)R) 6|= ¬`.
Proof of Claim 7: Note that if the letter f can be entailed then, for
each ` ∈ R \ {¬l}, by virtue of defaults δ(4)i and δ(5)2,j , there exists at least
one extension E` of (∆′(Φ),W ′(Φ)R) such that ` ∈ E` and, consequently,
(∆′(Φ),W ′(Φ)R) 6|= ¬`. 
We can now resume to the proof of Theorem 5.9.
(Only If part) Assume that L = {¬l} is a strong outlier in ∆′(Φ). Since
L is a strong outlier, there exists a strong outlier witness set S ⊆ W ′(Φ) \ L
for L.
By Claim 7, the letter f cannot belong to any extension of (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S),
for otherwise S is not a (strong) outlier witness set inasmuch as Condition 1
of Definition 2.6 is not satisfied. Thus, because of defaults δ
(5)
1,j , it is the case
that the set S contains all the literals in the set {c1, . . ., cm}.
Let C be {c1, . . . , cm} and let R be S \ C. By using exactly the same
argument as that employed in the Only-If part of Theorem 5.2, it can be
proved that (D(Φ),W (Φ)R) |= ¬(R ∪ C), and, by Lemma 3.11, it can be
concluded that the formula Φ is satisfiable.
(If part) Assume now that the formula Φ is satisfiable. Then, by Lemma
3.11, there exists a set of literalsR ⊆ {x1, . . . , xn} such that (D(Φ),W (Φ)R) |=
¬(R ∪ C).
Let S be R ∪ C. We next show that (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) |= ¬S. By
semi-monotonicity, it follows that there exists at least one extension E ′ of
(D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) such that E ′ ⊇ ¬(R ∪ C). Moreover, since no default in
D4∪D5∪D6 may belong to the set of generating defaults of (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S),
it is the case that each extension E ′ of (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) is such that E ′ ⊇
¬(R ∪ C). Indeed, f cannot be entailed by this theory since no letter
among c1, . . . , cm appears in W
′(Φ)S and in the consequence of any default
in D′(Φ) and, moreover, ¬l belongs to W ′(Φ)S. It can thus be concluded
that (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S) |= ¬S.
Since, by virtue of the defaults in the set D6, there exists at least one
extension E of the theory (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S,{¬l}) such that f belongs to E ,
by Claim 7, that (D′(Φ),W ′(Φ)S,{¬l}) satisfies Condition 2 of Definition 2.6
is implied and, hence, that S is a strong outlier witness set for L. Thus,
L = {¬l} is a strong outlier set in ∆′(Φ). This closes the proof. 
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We close the section by noticing that, as far as the complexity of the
Strong Outlier Recognition problem on propositional DF and general default
theories is concerned, the following result directly follows from Theorem 5.9.
Corollary 5.10. Strong Outlier Recognition for DF and general default the-
ories is NP-hard.
6. The tractabilty/intractability frontier for Outlier Existence
In this section we characterize the complexity of the outlier existence
problem. We recall from Section 2.3that the Outlier Existence problem is:
given a default theory ∆ = (D,W ) and a positive integer k, is it true that
there exists and outlier L in ∆ such that |L| ≤ k?
We begin by considering the complexity of this problem on general (cyclic)
NU default theories.
Theorem 6.1. Over NU default theories, the problem Outlier Existence is
NP-complete.
Proof: The result immediately follows from (Angiulli et al., 2010), where
it is shown that Outlier Existence over NU theories is NP-complete for any
fixed constant k. 
Unluckily, restricting attention to strong outliers and quasi-acyclic NU
default theories does not allow to attain tractability on this problem, as
detailed by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2. Strong Outlier Existence for quasi-acyclic NU default theo-
ries is in NP-complete.
Proof: (Membership) Let n be |W |. It suffice to guess an outlier witness
set L ⊂ W of size not grater than k ≤ n and to check that there exists
a witness set S ⊂ W of size at most c, with c the tightness of ∆, such
that (D,WS)|=¬S and (D,WS,L) 6 |=¬S. The whole computation can be
accomplished in nondeterministic polynomial time by a Turing machine.
(Hardness) The proof is by reduction to the well-known NP-complete
problem Hitting Set : given a collection C = {E1, . . . , Em} of subsets of a
finite set V and a positive integer k ≤ |V |, is there a subset H ≤ V , with
|H| ≤ k, such that H contains at least one element from each subset in C?
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Let Ei = {vi,1, . . . , vi,ni}, with 1 ≤ i ≤ m. The default theory ∆(C) =
(D(C),W (C)) is associated with the collection C, where W (C) = ¬V ∪{l, s}
and D(C) = D1 ∪D2 ∪D3, with
D1 =
{
l : ¬s
¬s
}
,
D2 =
{
: ei
ei
,
ei : ¬s
¬s | i = 1, . . . ,m
}
, and
D3 =
{
: vi,j
vi,j
,
vi,j : ¬ei
¬ei , | i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , ni
}
,
where l and e1, . . . , em are new elements distinct from those occurring in V .
Note that the theory ∆(C) is quasi-acyclic and has tightness c = 1.
It is shown next that C has an hitting set of size k iff there exists a strong
outlier set L in ∆(C) having size k + 1.
First of all, notice that s is the unique literal in W (C) that can be part of
an outlier witness set, since (i) for any literal ` in W (C), ` does not appear in
the conclusion of a default rule, and (ii) s is the only literal in W (C) which
appears negated in the conclusion of a non-empty prerequisiste default.
Moreover, S = {s} is indeed an outlier witness set, as (D(C),W (C){s})|=¬s
by means of the default in the set D1.
(Only If part) Assume that C has an hitting set H of size k. Consider
the set L = {l} ∪ {¬v : v ∈ H} having size k + 1. Now it is shown that L is
an outlier set.
Due the defaults in the set D2 and since no default in ∆(C) has s in its
conclusion, if at least a letter ei belongs to an extension of (D(C),W (C){s},L)
then ¬s belongs to the same extension, Thus, (D(C),W (C){s},L) 6 |=¬s iff
there exists an extension E such that no letter ei occurs in E .
Consider now the defaults in the set D3. If at least a letter vi,j does not
occur in W (C){s},L, then there exists an extension which contains ¬ei and
does not contain ei (1 ≤ i ≤ m). Since, by construction, H coincides with
L \ {l}, an extension E such that no letter ei occurs in E indeed exists. This
proves that L is an outlier set.
(If part) Assume that there exists an outlier set L ⊆ W (C) \ {s} of size
k + 1.
Then, it must be the case that L ⊇ {l}, for otherwise (D(C),W (C){s},L)|=¬s
by means of the default in D1.
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1: Input: ∆ = (D,W ) – a NU default theory; k – a positive integer.
2: Output: Out – the set of all strong outlier sets L in ∆ s.t. |L| ≤ k.
3: let C1, . . . , CN the ordered SCCs in the atomic dependency graph of
∆;
4: Out = ∅;
5: for i = 1 to N do
6: for all S ⊂ W s.t. letter(S) ⊆ Ci do
7: if (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS) |= ¬` then
8: for all L ⊆ WS s.t. |L| ≤ k and letter(L) ⊆ (C1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ci)
do
9: if (∀` ∈ S)(D,WS,L) 6|= ¬` then
10: Out = Out ∪ {L};
11: end if
12: end for
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
Figure 3: Algorithm Strong Outlier Enumeration.
As already stated, it is the case that (D(C),W (C){s},L) 6 |=¬s if and only
if there exists an extension E such that no letter ei occurs in E .
Such an extension exists provided that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, at least
a letter vi,j occurs in W (C){s},L. Since letters ei are associated with sets Ei,
it is the case that L \ {l} encodes an hitting set H having size k. 
7. Tractable strong outlier enumeration algorithm
Based on the above results, we are now ready to describe the algorithm
Strong Outlier Enumeration which, for a fixed integer k, enumerates in poly-
nomial time all the strong outlier sets of size at most k in a quasi-acyclic NU
default theory.
The algorithm is detailed in Figure 3. The SCCs C1, . . . , CN of the atomic
dependency graph of the theory are ordered such that there do not exist Ci
and Cj with i < j and two letters l ∈ Ci and q ∈ Cj such that there exists a
path from letter(q) to letter(j).
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The algorithm exploits Lemma 5.7 in order to restrict the search space of
witness sets to the subsets of the SCCs of the atomic dependency graph (see
steps 5-6), exploits Lemma 3.10 in order to consider as part of the candidate
strong outlier set L only literals potentially influencing those included in the
current witness set S (see step 8, where only SCCs preceding Ci are taken
into account),4 and exploits Proposition 3.3 in order to solve the entailment
problem in O(n2) time (see steps 7 and 9).
As for the cost of the algorithm, the number of strong outlier witness
sets is O(2c(n/c)), O(cn2) is the cost of checking the first and the second
condition of the outlier definition, while the number of of strong outlier sets
is O(nk). Summarizing, the cost of the algorithm is
O(2c(n/c)(cn2 + nkcn2)) = O(2cnk+3).
Since c and k are fixed, the algorithm enumerates the strong outliers in
polynomial time in the size of (D,W ). For example, all the singleton strong
outlier sets can be enumerated in time O(n4).
8. A technical discussion regarding the tractability/intractability
frontier
Before closing the paper, we would like to offer some further comments
concerning the technical results presented above regarding the Outlier Recog-
nition Problem. From Theorems 5.2 and 5.9, it is clear that neither quasi-
acyclicity nor strongness alone are sufficient to achieve tractability for this
problem. However, if both constraints are imposed together, the complexity
of the outlier recognition problem falls within the tractability frontier, as
shown in Theorem 5.8. In order to better understand the underlying ratio-
nale, we informally discuss next why the techniques exploited in the proofs of
Theorems 5.2 and 5.9 fail in this case. By Lemma 3.11, it follows that, despite
the difficulty to encode the conjunction of a set of literals exploiting a NU
theory, a CNF formula can still be evaluated by means of condition 1 of Defi-
nition 2.6 applied to a quasi-acyclic NU theory. In particular, in the construc-
tion of Lemma 3.11, the letters c1, . . . , cm play the role of encoding the truth
values of the conjuncts C1, . . . , Cm composing the 3CNF formula Φ = f(X),
4As a further optimization, only SCCs influencing Ci should be taken into account in
this step.
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while the subset S(Φ) of X = {x1, . . . , xn} encodes a truth value assignment
to the variables in the set X (specifically, xi is true iff it does not belong to
S(Φ)). Hence, checking for (D(Φ),W (Φ)S(Φ)) |= ¬(S(Φ) ∪ {c1, . . . , cm}) is
equivalent to verifying if C1∧. . .∧Cm is true under the truth value assignment
encoded by S(Φ) (see Lemma 3.11 for the formal proof).
Now, in the presence of cyclicity, it is possible to constrain the witness
set S to contain all the letters c1, . . . , cm, by including them in the same SCC
of the atomic dependency graph and, thus, to resort to Lemma 3.11 in order
to prove NP-hardness (the reader is referred to Theorem 5.9 for the details).
In the quasi-acyclic case, it is still possible to constrain the witness set
S to contain all the letters c1, . . . , cm, by exploiting condition 2 of Definition
2.6 as done in the reduction of Theorem 5.2. In particular, the reduction
introduces a dummy letter c0 in the theory such that (D,WS,L) 6|= ¬c0. As
for the letters c1, . . . , cm, their negation is entailed both by (D,WS) and by
(D,WS,L). Thus, in order to satisfy condition 2 of Definition 2.6, c0 must be
in S. However, in order for (D,WS) |= ¬c0 to hold, it must be the case that
all letters ci (1 ≤ i ≤ m) are in S. In terms of the atomic dependency graph,
this has been obtained by adding an arc from each ci to c0 together with an
arc from l to c0 (recall that L = {¬l} in the reduction), without the need of
introducing cycles in the graph.
However, if both quasi-acyclicity and outlier strongness are imposed, in
order to exploit Lemma 3.11, it is needed to guarantee that for each ci,
(D,WS,L) 6|= ¬ci without the possibility of introducing cycles in the atomic
dependency graph. Informally speaking, a possibility would be to add an
arc from l to any ci, so that (D,WS,L) |= ci ( hence this theory does not
entail ¬ci), but the graph would become cyclic (see the graph in Figure
2). Moreover, removing the dummy letter c0 from the reduction in order
to break the cycle would not help, since in this case each singleton set {ci}
would act as a potential strong outlier witness set for L = {¬l}. It can be
intuitively concluded that requiring quasi-acyclicity and strongness simulta-
neously prevents the size of the minimal outlier witness to be unbounded
(this intuition is indeed formalized by Lemma 5.7) and, hence, prevents the
feasibility of reducing satisfiability to the strong outlier recognition problem
by exploiting the technique depicted in Lemma 3.11. Indeed, if the size of
S is bounded, CNFs having more than |S| conjuncts cannot be evaluated by
means of condition 1 of Definition 2.6.
To conclude, we note that switching to cyclic theories, general outliers,
and NMU theories makes the cost of the Outlier Enumeration algorithm
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exponential. This is justified by the results provided throughout the paper.
Moreover, we point out the following observations:
• For strong outliers, if the tightness c is unbounded (on quasi-acyclic
theories) the cost of the algorithm depends exponentially on c (see
Theorem 5.9 for the proof of the intractability of the Strong Outlier
Recognition problem on quasi-acyclic NU theories).
• For general outliers, the algorithm still works provided that in line 4
the set S is constrained to be a subset of Ci ∪ . . . ∪ CN , instead of a
subset of Ci, and that in line 6 the set L is constrained to be a subset
of C1 ∪ . . .∪Cw, where w = max{j : l ∈ S and letter(l) ∈ Cj}, instead
of a subset of C1∪ . . .∪Ci (note that w ≥ i). However, in this case, the
algorithm depends exponentially on n, even if it takes advantage of the
structural property provided by the Incremental Lemma (see Theorem
5.2 for the proof of the intractability of the Outlier Recognition problem
on NU theories). To break the exponential dependency on n, the size
of the outlier witness set S should be constrained to be within a certain
fixed threshold h, that is |S| ≤ h.
• The algorithm can be applied also to NMU theories, but in this case
the cost of steps 7 and 9 depends exponentially on the size of the
theory (the reader is referred to Theorem 3.2 for the proof of the co-
NP-completeness of the entailment problem for propositional (quasi-
acyclic) NMU theories).
9. Conclusions
Traditional approaches model the normal behavior of individuals by per-
forming some statistical analysis on the given data set and, then, singling out
those individuals whose behavior or characteristics significantly deviate from
normal ones. On the other hand, it is supposedly quite interesting to exploit
domain knowledge in order to guide the search for anomalous observations.
The outlier detection technique investigated here is based on the defini-
tion introduced in (Angiulli et al., 2008), which is an unsupervised one, in
that no examples of normality/abnormality are required. This technique can
be applied to databases including observations to be examined, databases
provided by the organization which is interested in learning exceptional indi-
viduals. In order to exploit domain knowledge, databases are to be coupled
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with a knowledgebase composed of default rules and observations. The de-
fault rules can be supplied directly by the knowledge engineer or they can
be a product of a rule learning module. E.g., the rule learning step can be
based on theory and algorithms developed for learning default rules (Duval
and Nicolas, 1999) and/or for metaquerying (Shen et al., 1996; Ben-Eliyahu-
Zohary et al., 2003; Angiulli et al., 2003)5.
As a major contribution of this paper, we have analyzed the tractability
border associated with outlier detection problems in default logics.
Overall, the results and arguments reported in this paper indicate that
outlier recognition, even in its strong version, remains challenging and dif-
ficult on general default theories. The tractability results we have provided
nonetheless indicate that there. are significant cases which can be efficiently
implemented.
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